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Over the last decades, great strides have been 
made in our understanding of  the factors that 
cause members of  disadvantaged groups (e.g., 
women, ethnic minorities) to work together with 
others in an effort to improve the societal position 
of  their group. This work shows that the forma-
tion of  a bond with likeminded others (i.e., the 
formation of  a politicized collective identity) is a 
particularly important predictor of  individuals’ 
willingness to engage in activism—behavior 
aimed at achieving these shared collective goals. 
At the same time, however, politicized individuals’ 
relations with others who are not (as) committed to 
the collective cause have received far less attention 
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2 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 
(for notable exceptions, see Simon & Grabow, 
2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). This is unfortunate 
because, under most circumstances, the majority 
of  people, both within and outside the disadvan-
taged group, are not activists, yet the feasibility of  
social change often depends on their support (e.g., 
Louis, 2009).
In the present paper we argue that the politici-
zation process that binds like-minded people 
together in their effort to achieve social change 
may also drive apart those who are committed to 
social change from those who are not. More spe-
cifically, we argue that to the extent that the devel-
opment of  a politicized collective identity implies 
the adoption of  a moral attitude about the collec-
tive cause, the relation between the politicized 
and the nonpoliticized may not be unequivocally 
positive.
Politicization
The term politicized collective identification 
refers to the extent to which individuals identify 
with a social movement and have internalized its 
norms and values. Feminists, for example, iden-
tify with the feminist movement and have inter-
nalized its values and its norms to take collective 
action against gender inequality. According to 
Simon and Klandermans (2001), individuals 
begin to develop a politicized collective identity 
when they become aware of  grievances they 
share with the other members of  their group. 
The process of  politicization continues when 
they make adversarial attributions for these griev-
ances, placing the blame on an outgroup and 
engaging in a struggle for power with this out-
group in order to redress these grievances. In the 
final stages of  politicization, the individuals are 
thought to become aware of  the influence of  
third parties in resolving their grievances and tri-
angulate their own position in relation to that of  
the outgroup and that of  the relevant third par-
ties in order to mobilize the latter to their cause. 
Research has consistently shown that the extent 
to which individuals are politicized (i.e., identify 
with a social movement) forms a particularly 
strong predictor of  collective action (e.g., Kelly, 
1993; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al., 
1998; Sturmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008).
Whereas much research has addressed the 
consequences of  politicized identification for 
collective action participation, relatively little is 
known about the way the politicization process 
shapes attitudes towards individuals who are not 
(as) committed to the cause. A notable exception 
is the work by Simon and colleagues (Simon & 
Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). According 
to the authors, politicized collective identity 
entails both identification with the aggrieved 
group whose societal disadvantage must be 
addressed and identification with society as a 
whole. This identification with society is thought 
to arise out of  the recognition that the aggrieved 
group is only entitled to support for its claims 
due to broader societal norms. In line with these 
ideas, the authors showed that politicized collec-
tive identification among Turkish and Russian 
immigrants in Germany was positively related to 
identification with both the relevant disadvan-
taged ingroup and with German society (Simon 
& Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008).
Whereas we acknowledge that the relation 
between politicized individuals and those who are 
not (as) committed to the collective cause (be 
they members of  the same disadvantaged group 
or members of  the same society) can be positive, 
we believe that this is not unequivocally the case. 
Rather, we argue that the politicization process 
involves the moralization of  the collective cause, 
which has the potential to drive a wedge between 
the politicized and those who are less committed 
to the collective cause, be they members of  the 
same society, or even members of  the same dis-
advantaged group.
Morality and the Relation 
Between the Politicized and the 
Nonpoliticized
We argue that the politicization process results in 
a moralized attitude (a moral conviction) about 
the collective cause, which has the potential to 
affect the relation between the politicized and 
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those less committed to the collective cause. The 
term moral conviction refers to strong and stable 
beliefs about right and wrong (Skitka, 2002; 
Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 
2002; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). 
According to Skitka and colleagues, moral con-
victions differ from other strong, but nonmoral 
attitudes in several ways. First of  all, moral con-
victions, in contrast to any other type of  attitude, 
are experienced as universal prescriptions (i.e., as 
norms that everyone should conform to). Second, 
moral convictions, more than other strong but 
nonmoral attitudes, are connected to intense 
emotional experiences. Those who hold an atti-
tude with moral conviction experience intense 
negative emotions (such as anger) with regard to 
what they see as immoral (Haidt, 2003; Mullen & 
Skitka, 2006; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 
1999). Finally, moral convictions, more than 
other types of  attitudes, carry within them the 
obligation to act (Skitka et al., 2005).
The concepts of  politicized collective identity 
and moral conviction show considerable overlap. 
First of  all, theoretically, the politicization pro-
cess involves psychologically changing a conflict 
of  interest between two groups into grievances that 
are blamed on an outgroup. Blaming an outgroup 
for an outcome, instead of  merely placing the 
cause of  this outcome with this other group, indi-
cates the outgroup has transgressed some moral 
boundary, and thus constitutes a moral judgment. 
Coming to blame shared grievances on an out-
group therefore represents the change from a 
conflict of  interest between two groups to a con-
flict with a moral component. The theory of  
politicization can thus be seen to describe the 
moralization of  the collective cause.
Consistent with this interpretation of  the the-
ory, research shows a strong connection between 
politicized collective identification and the morali-
zation of  the collective cause (van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2012). More precisely, like 
politicized collective identification (Sturmer & 
Simon, 2009; Sturmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 
2003; van Zomeren et al., 2008), moral conviction 
increases feelings of  anger at injustice, and 
strengthens individuals’ belief  in the efficacy of  
collective action in producing social change 
(Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Rozin et al., 1999; van 
Zomeren et al., 2012), and can explain why politi-
cized individuals would experience a felt inner 
obligation to engage in collective action (Skitka 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, theory and research 
suggest that during the politicization process, the 
moralization of  the collective cause can result 
from interactions with like-minded others (Thomas 
& McGarty, 2009; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 
2009), thereby further strengthening individuals’ 
bonds with these others and increasing their moti-
vation to pursue social change (van Zomeren et al., 
2012). Thus, consistent with our reading of  the 
theory, research thus suggests there is a strong rela-
tion between individuals’ level of  politicized col-
lective identification and the extent to which they 
moralize the collective cause.
If, as we argue, the politicization process 
involves the moralization of  the collective cause, 
this should have important consequences for the 
relation between the politicized and those who 
are less committed to the collective cause. Work 
by Skitka and colleagues (2005; see also Wright 
et al., 2008) shows that individuals who hold an 
attitude with moral conviction tend to respond 
negatively to others who do not share this atti-
tude or opinion. More precisely, Skitka and col-
leagues show that attitude dissimilarity in moral 
domains causes individuals to distance them-
selves psychologically, and even physically, from 
others who do not share that attitude. 
Furthermore, holding an attitude with moral con-
viction has been shown to cause individuals to 
experience negative moral emotions such as 
anger (Mullen & Skitka, 2006), contempt, and 
disgust (Haidt, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999) towards 
attitudinally dissimilar others.
If, as we argue, politicized identification is 
associated with strong moral convictions, then 
politicized individuals’ evaluations of  others 
should in large part depend on the extent to 
which these others are seen as supporting the col-
lective cause. We investigate this prediction in the 
current research. We hypothesize that individuals’ 
level of  politicization, because it implies holding 
a moral conviction about the goal of  collective 
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action, affects their responses to attitudinally sim-
ilar and dissimilar others. Specifically, we propose 
that politicized individuals (but not nonpoliti-
cized individuals) will (a) identify less with, (b) 
experience more negative emotions towards, and 
(c) prefer greater social distance from others who 
do not agree with their cause than from others 
who agree with their cause (Studies 1–3). 
Furthermore, we expect the association between 
individuals’ level of  politicization and their 
responses to attitudinally similar and dissimilar 
others to be explained by the extent to which they 
hold a moralized attitude about the collective 
cause (Studies 2 and 3).
Overview of the Studies
These predictions were investigated in three stud-
ies in the context of  feminism and gender equal-
ity. In Study 1, we examined how politicized 
(feminist) identification predicts identification 
with the broader category (women) depending on 
how much other women are perceived to attach 
moral importance to the cause (gender equality). 
In Study 2 we sought to replicate and extend the 
results of  Study 1 in the context of  actual femi-
nist activism. Here, we assessed politicized identi-
fication and the extent to which support for the 
activist cause was seen as a moral obligation as 
predictors of  the emotional responses of  femi-
nist activists towards other women who do not 
agree with the feminist cause. Finally, in Study 3 
we investigated how politicized (feminist) identi-
fication and moral conviction are associated with 
participants’ preferred social distance from an 
attitudinally similar (feminist) or dissimilar (sex-
ist) target.
Study 1
Study 1 examined how politicized (feminist) iden-
tification is associated with identification with the 
broader category (women), depending on how 
much other women are perceived to attach moral 
importance to the cause (gender equality). We 
expected that women who strongly identify with 
feminism would identify less with other women 
when they believe these women attach moderate, 
rather than strong, moral importance to gender 
equality.
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-five Dutch female 
students from Leiden University (Mage = 20.73, 
SD = 2.66) took part in this experiment in 
exchange for €3.00 or course credit.1 They were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a one-
factor (the moral importance other Dutch women 
attach to gender equality: high vs. moderate) 
between-participants design. Identification with 
feminism was assessed as an independent variable 
prior to the manipulation, and identification with 
Dutch women served as the dependent variable.
Procedure. Participants were told that they would 
be taking part in a study on attitudes towards gen-
der equality. To provide context for the measures 
and manipulations employed in this study, all par-
ticipants were first asked to read a short text 
describing gender inequality in the Netherlands 
that has been used before to the same end (Zaal, 
van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011, 2012). 
Through this text it was explained that women in 
the Netherlands earn approximately 7.5% less 
than men for the same work and that they receive 
fewer opportunities for promotion. We subse-
quently measured participants’ feminist identification 
using five items (with 9-point Likert scales, “I 
identify with feminism,” “I feel a bond with other 
feminists,” “I consider myself  to be a feminist,” 
“I have a lot in common with feminists,” “I don’t 
feel connected to feminism [reverse scored]”; α = 
.93, M = 4.69, SD = 1.74).
Participants were then asked to read a short 
research report that ostensibly summarized the 
results of  a survey of  Dutch women’s attitudes 
towards gender equality. In reality, this report was 
constructed to serve as the manipulation of  the 
moral importance other women attach to gender 
equality. In the high moral importance condition 
participants read that, on average, other Dutch 
women strongly moralize the goal of  gender equal-
ity, whereas in the moderate moral importance 
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condition, participants read that on average, other 
Dutch women only moderately moralized the goal 
gender equality (see Appendix A).
Group efficacy was measured with four items 
(with 9-point Likert scales, “I think that we as 
women are capable of  countering gender discrim-
ination,” “I believe that actions against gender dis-
crimination will be successful,” “I believe that it is 
possible to counter gender discrimination,” “I 
believe that actions against gender discrimination 
will have the desired effect”; α = .87, M = 6.50, 
SD = 1.19). Group efficacy was included to serve 
as a control variable. This allowed us to rule out 
the possibility that feminist participants would 
identify less with women who placed only moder-
ate moral importance on gender equality because 
of  seeing these women as a barrier to social 
change, instead of  as less moral.
Identification with other Dutch women was meas-
ured with five items (with 9-point Likert scales, 
e.g., “I identify with other Dutch women,” “I feel 
a bond with other Dutch women,” “Being a 
Dutch woman is an important part of  how I see 
myself,” “Being a Dutch woman is an important 
part of  my identity,” “In many ways, I am like 
other Dutch women”; α = .89, M = 6.18, SD = 
1.42). Finally, all participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid. Means, standard deviations, 
and correlations of  the measures are included in 
Table 1.
Results
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was used to 
investigate the prediction that individuals’ level 
of  politicization is positively associated with disi-
dentification with others who are not believed 
(vs. are believed) to share their commitment to 
the political goal. In Step 1 the standardized femi-
nist identification measure and the effect-coded 
manipulation were entered as independent varia-
bles into the analysis, and their interaction was 
entered in Step 2. The results revealed a nonsig-
nificant main effect of  feminist identification, b = 
0.09, t(81) = 0.58, p = .57, and a significant main 
effect of  the manipulation, b = −0.23, t(81) = 
−2.01, p = .05, which indicates that participants 
identified less with other women who were 
believed to attach moderate (vs. high) moral value 
to gender equality. More importantly, the results 
revealed the predicted interaction between the 
measure of  feminist identification and the manip-
ulation, b = −0.41, t(81) = −2.77, p = .007, ΔR2 = 
.08 (see Figure 1). Simple slope analysis (Aiken & 
West, 1991) showed that believing other women 
to attach moderate (compared to high) moral 
importance to gender equality was associated 
with a reduced identification with women among 
participants high in feminist identification, b = 
−0.71, t(81) = −3.40, p = .001, but not among 
participants low in feminist identification, −1 SD, 
b = 0.09, t(81) = 0.55, p = .59.
Viewed differently, the results showed that 
feminist identification was only positively associ-
ated with identification with women when par-
ticipants believed these other women to attach 
high moral importance to gender equality, b = 
0.50, t(81) = 2.46, p = .02. When participants 
believed other women only to attach moderate 
moral importance to gender equality, feminist 
identification was not positively related to identi-
fication with women. In fact, there was even a 
nonsignificant trend in the opposite direction, 
b = −0.33, t(81) = −1.49, p = .14.
Including group efficacy and its interaction 
with feminist identification in these analyses does 
not alter the results, the Feminist Identification x 
Manipulation interaction remains significant, b = 
−0.42, t(79) = 2.78, p = .007. This finding allows 
us to rule out an alternative explanation for the 
results, namely that feminists identified less with 
Dutch women in the moderate moral importance 
condition than in the high moral importance con-
dition because they saw Dutch women in the 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
of the measures used in Study 1.
M SD 1. 2. 3.
1. Feminist identification 4.69 1.74 – .06 .22*
2. Identification with women 6.18 1.42 – .06
3. Group efficacy 6.50 1.19 –
*p < .05.
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moderate moral importance condition as a bar-
rier to social change, instead of  as less moral. 
Neither group efficacy, b = 0.10, t(79) < 1, p = 
.71, nor its interaction with feminist identifica-
tion, b = 0.10, t(79) < 1, p = .41, significantly pre-
dicted identification with Dutch women.
Discussion and Introduction to Study 2
Study 1 provided initial evidence for the hypothe-
sis that individuals’ level of  politicized identifica-
tion would be associated with the experience of  a 
psychological distance between themselves and 
others who do not attach high moral importance 
to the political cause. As predicted, the results 
showed that women who strongly identify with 
feminism identify less with other women when 
they believe these women attach moderate, rather 
than strong, moral importance to gender equality. 
Also as predicted, among individuals who did not 
identify strongly with feminism, no association 
between the moral importance other women 
attach to gender equality and identification with 
these women was found. Thus, this study demon-
strates experimentally that differences of  opinion 
with other women about the moral importance of  
gender equality are associated with an increased 
social distance towards these women among indi-
viduals high in feminist identification.
Even though these results are clear and in line 
with predictions, Study 1 does have some limita-
tions. First, the individuals participating in this 
study were all young, undergraduate social sci-
ence students, most of  whom were not involved 
in any organized form of  activism (in fact, only 
one reported being a member of  a feminist 
organization). This makes it uncertain whether 
we can generalize the findings of  Study 1 to 
actual political activists. To address this limita-
tion, we surveyed feminist activists’ opinions of  
women who disagree with the feminist cause in 
Study 2.
Second, even though dissimilarities in non-
moral attitudes should not have led to the 
observed effects (Skitka et al., 2005), Study 1 did 
not directly measure participants’ moral consid-
erations about the activist cause as an explanatory 
variable. This means that, even though the results 
of  Study 1 are in line with predictions and diffi-
cult to explain in other ways (Skitka et al., 2005), 
4
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7
8
9
Strongly moral Moderately moral
Manipulation
Identification with women
Weak feminist ID (-1
SD)
Strong feminist ID (+1
SD)
Figure 1. Identification with other women as a function of identification with feminism and the manipulation 
of the moral importance other women attach to gender equality.
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we have yet to directly demonstrate the role of  
moral considerations in politicized individuals’ 
evaluation of  less committed others. To address 
this limitation, in Study 2 we directly assessed the 
extent to which participants saw supporting gen-
der equality as a moral obligation.
Study 2
Study 2 examined how politicized (feminist) iden-
tification is associated with the evaluation of  
women who do not agree with the feminist cause 
among members of  a feminist activist group. We 
expected that feminist identification, to the extent 
that it implies seeing support for gender equality 
as a moral obligation, would be associated with 
more negative evaluations of  women who do not 
agree with the feminist cause.
Method
Participants. Fifty-eight members of a British 
feminist organization (Mage = 34.62, SD = 13.59) 
participated in this survey in exchange for a 
chance to win one of three ₤50.00 vouchers in a 
prize draw.2,3 Participants were recruited through 
an advertisement on a feminist organization’s 
website.
Measures. Feminist identification was measured with 
five items (“Being a feminist activist is an impor-
tant part of  how I see myself,” “I feel solidarity 
with other feminist activists,” “I have a lot in 
common with the average feminist activists,” “I 
am glad to be a feminist activist,” “Feminist 
activists have a lot in common with each other”; 
α = .76).
The extent to which participants perceived that sup-
porting gender equality is a moral obligation was meas-
ured with seven items (e.g., “Supporting the 
feminist cause is a moral obligation,” “Not sup-
porting the feminist cause is immoral,” 
“Supporting the feminist cause is the only moral 
position,” “Women who do not support the femi-
nist cause are just as moral as feminist activists” 
[reverse scored], “Whether or not someone sup-
ports the feminist cause says nothing about their 
morality” [reverse scored], “Feminist activists are 
morally superior to women who do not support 
the feminist cause,” “I find it morally indefensible 
not to support the feminist cause”; α = .80).
Six items were used to measure negative emotions 
towards women who do not agree with the feminist cause 
(anger, outrage, contempt, disgust, disdain, hos-
tility; α = .89). These specific emotions were 
selected because research had identified them as 
important in both the collective action literature 
(e.g., Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren, Spears, 
Fischer, & Leach, 2004) and the morality litera-
ture (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; 
Rozin et al., 1999). Means, standard deviations 
and correlations of  the measures are included in 
Table 2.
Results
Mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) was 
used to investigate the prediction that feminist 
identification, because it involves the moraliza-
tion of  gender equality, would be associated with 
the experience of  negative emotions towards 
women who do not agree with the feminist 
cause.3 Analyses showed that identification with 
feminism predicted the extent to which partici-
pants saw supporting gender equality as a moral 
obligation, b = 0.52, t(53) = 2.45, p = .02, ΔR2 = 
.10. Furthermore, identification with feminism 
predicted the extent to which participants experi-
enced negative emotions toward women who do 
not agree with the feminist cause, b = 0.54, t(53) 
= 2.06, p = .04, ΔR2 = .06. Finally, when the 
extent to which participants saw supporting gen-
der equality as a moral obligation was entered 
into this analysis, the effect of  identification with 
feminism on the experience of  negative emotions 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
of the measures used in Study 2.
M SD 1. 2. 3.
1. Feminist identification 6.16 0.65 – .32* .27*
2. Moral obligation 3.54 1.42 – .38*
3. Negative emotions 2.57 1.27 –
*p < .05.
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towards women who do not agree with the femi-
nist cause was no longer significant, b = 0.28, 
t(52) = 1.10, p = .27, whereas moral obligation 
emerged as a significant predictor, b = 0.49, t(52) 
= 3.11, p = .003, ΔR2 = .15. Bootstrap analysis 
using 5,000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) 
showed that the indirect effect of  feminist identi-
fication on negative emotions through moral 
obligation was significant (indirect effect = 0.26, 
bias corrected 95% CI [0.04, 0.71]). The media-
tion model is depicted in Figure 2. Thus, the 
results of  Study 2 demonstrate that politicized 
identification is positively associated with the 
experience of  negative emotions towards others 
who do not agree with this goal, to the extent that 
it involves holding a moralized view of  the collec-
tive cause.
Discussion and Introduction to Study 3
As predicted, the results of  Study 2 showed that, 
in a sample of  feminist activists, feminist identifi-
cation was associated with the experience of  neg-
ative emotions towards others who disagree with 
this cause to the extent that it involves holding a 
moralized view about gender equality. Importantly, 
the finding that feminist identification did not pre-
dict negative emotions towards women who disa-
greed with the collective cause when we controlled 
for moral obligation allows us to rule out the pos-
sibility that feminist identification mediated the 
effects of  moral obligation on negative emotions. 
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 offer converging 
evidence for the prediction that politicized identi-
fication—to the extent that it implies holding a 
moral attitude about the collective cause—differ-
entially affects responses towards attitudinally 
similar and dissimilar others.
A question that remains unanswered is 
whether the way politicized individuals respond 
to others is pulled primarily by positive responses 
to attitudinal similarity, or by negative responses 
to attitudinal dissimilarity. Because no control 
condition was included in Study 1, it was not pos-
sible to determine whether politicized (feminist) 
participants’ identification with women was 
increased (compared to baseline) by the “high” 
moral importance condition or lowered (compared 
to baseline) in the “moderate” moral importance 
condition in this study. Similarly, because Study 2 
only focused on targets who were attitudinally 
dissimilar (i.e., women who disagree with the 
feminist cause), this study does not yet shed light 
on the relative influence of  attitudinal similarity 
and dissimilarity on politicized individuals’ evalu-
ations of  others.
Importantly, research shows that, while moral 
conviction is associated with both positive reac-
tions to attitudinally similar others and negative 
reactions to attitudinally dissimilar others (Janoff-
Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Skitka et al., 2005; 
Wright et al., 2008), its negativity effects are 
Negative emotions
Moral obligation
0.52* 0.49**
0.28 (0.54*)
Identification with feminism
Figure 2. Among feminist activists, identification with feminism increases negative moral emotions towards 
women who disagree with the feminist cause through moral conviction about gender equality (all regression 
coefficients are unstandardized bs).
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generally found to be stronger than its positivity 
effects (e.g., Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). We therefore 
expected that politicized collective identification 
(to the extent that it implied holding a moral con-
viction about the collective cause), would be asso-
ciated with positive reactions to attitudinally 
similar others, and with negative reactions to atti-
tudinally dissimilar others. In line with work on 
moral conviction, we further expected that politi-
cized collective identification would be more 
strongly associated with negative reactions to atti-
tudinally dissimilar others than with positive reac-
tions to attitudinally similar others.
These predictions were investigated in Study 3. 
We experimentally manipulated a target’s attitude 
to be either clearly in favor of  gender equality or 
clearly opposed to gender equality. Participants’ 
preferred social distance to this target (Skitka 
et al., 2005) was measured before and after the tar-
get’s attitude to gender equality was manipulated. 
This pre- and posttest design allowed a clear dif-
ferentiation between positive responses to the tar-
get (a smaller preferred social distance on the 
posttest than on the pretest) and negative 
responses to the target (a larger preferred social 
distance on the posttest than on the pretest). We 
expected that participants’ level of  politicized col-
lective identification, to the extent that it implied 
holding a moral conviction about the collective 
cause (gender equality), would be associated with 
a preference for more social distance (compared 
to the premeasure) to an attitudinally dissimilar 
target and with a preference for less social dis-
tance (compared to the premeasure) to an attitudi-
nally similar target. We furthermore expected 
politicized collective identification to be associ-
ated with more distancing from the attitudinally 
dissimilar target than with approach of  the attitu-
dinally similar target.
In Study 3 we wished to investigate whether 
the effects of  politicized identification that we 
observed in Studies 1 and 2 extend beyond mem-
bers of  the broader disadvantaged group 
(women) and apply to men as well. We therefore 
chose to use a male target in Study 3.
Study 3
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and fifty-four 
women from the United States (Mage = 34.8., 
SD = 11.82) were recruited through Amazon’s 
MTurk (www.mturk.com) to take part in this 
10-minute study about gender equality in 
exchange for $1.50.4 All participants indicated 
being in favor of gender equality. Moral convic-
tion about gender equality and politicized (femi-
nist) identification were assessed as independent 
variables at the start of the experiment. Partici-
pants’ preferred social distance to a sexist or fem-
inist target served as the dependent variable.
Procedure. All variables were measured on 7-point 
Likert scales. The items used in this study are 
included in Appendix B. At the start of  the study 
we assessed the strength of  participants’ moral 
conviction about gender equality with seven items 
(e.g., “My position on gender equality is a reflec-
tion of  my core moral beliefs and convictions”; α 
= .94) and their feminist identification with 10 
items taken from Leach and colleagues (e.g., “I feel 
a bond with feminists”; Leach et al., 2008; α = .93).
Participants then read a short description of  a 
target person, John. This description identified 
John as a university student who enjoys his part-
time job, hanging out with his friends, and watch-
ing sports. At this point, we premeasured 
participants’ preferred social distance to the target 
with six items taken from Skitka and colleagues 
(Skitka et al., 2005). Participants indicated on a 
7-point scale the extent to which they would be 
unhappy (1) or happy (7) to have John play several 
roles in their lives (e.g., as a close friend or as a 
colleague; α = .90).
We then manipulated the target’s stance on gender 
equality. Participants in the sexist target condition 
learned that John opposes gender equality, 
whereas participants in the feminist target condition 
learned that John supports gender equality (see 
Appendix C).
We then again measured participants’ preferred 
social distance to John, using the same six items as 
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before the manipulation of  the target’s stance, α = .98. 
Finally, participants answered some background 
questions, were thanked for their participation, and 
paid: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
of  the measures are included in Table 3.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and correlations 
between the measures are included in Table 2. The 
items of  the pre- and postmeasures of  social dis-
tance were reverse-scored so that higher values 
indicate a greater desire for social distance. We cal-
culated a difference score between the pre- and 
postmeasures of  social distance to function as the 
dependent variable. Positive scores on this varia-
ble indicate participants’ desire for more distance 
to the target upon learning his stance on gender 
equality; negative scores indicate a desire for more 
closeness. Differences in numbers of  degrees of  
freedom between similar analyses are caused by 
the list-wise deletion of  missing values.
Social distancing. Social distancing to the target was 
analyzed with hierarchical multiple regression. In 
the first step, the effect-coded manipulation of  the 
target’s stance on gender equality (1 for the feminist 
target condition, −1 for the sexist target condition) 
and the standardized feminist identification scale 
were entered. Their interaction was entered in Step 
2. The results showed a marginally significant main 
effect of  feminist identification,b = 0.17, t(131) = 
1.65, p = .09, and a significant main effect of  the 
manipulation of  the target’s stance on the social 
distancing measure, b = 1.75, t(131) = 17.66, p < 
.001. Importantly though, these effects were quali-
fied by the predicted interaction between the 
manipulation of  the target’s stance and feminist 
identification, b = 0.40, t(131) = 3.96, p < .001, ΔR2 
= .03 (see Figure 3). Simple slope analyses (Aiken & 
West, 1991) revealed that participants’ feminist 
identification was associated with a desire for more 
social distance to the sexist target, b = 0.56, t(131) = 
3.72, p < .001, and was marginally significantly 
associated with a preference for more social close-
ness to the feminist target, b = −0.23, t(131) = 
−1.79, p = .08. As predicted, these results thus 
Figure 3. Social distancing to the target (postmeasure − premeasure) as a function of feminist identification 
and the manipulation of the target’s stance towards gender equality in Study 3.
Table 3. Study 3: Means, standard deviations, and 
correlations.
M SD 1. 2. 3. 4.
1. Moral conviction 5.45 1.36 – .66*** −.14 .01
2.  Feminist 
identification
4.26 1.36 – −.21* −.04
3.  Premeasure of 
social distance
2.95 1.04 – .22**
4.  Postmeasure of 
social distance
3.94 2.09 –
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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showed that feminist identification is associated 
with a desire for more social distance from a sexist 
target, and a desire for somewhat more social close-
ness to a feminist target.
A similar analysis, now using the measure of  
moral conviction as the independent variable 
instead of  the measure of  feminist identification, 
revealed a main effect of  moral conviction, b = 
0.21, t(138) = 2.31, p = .02, a main effect of  the 
manipulation of  target’s stance, b = 1.76, t(138) = 
18.99, p < .001, as well as the predicted interaction 
between moral conviction and the target’s stance, 
b = 0.43, t(138) = 4.65, p < .001, ΔR2 = .04 (see 
Figure 4). As predicted, simple slope analyses 
revealed that the strength of  participants’ moral 
conviction about gender equality was associated 
with a desire for more social distance to the sexist 
target, b = 0.65, t(138) = 4.80, p < .001, and was 
marginally significantly associated with a desire 
for more social closeness to the feminist target, 
b = −0.22, t(138) = −1.70, p = .09. Thus, as pre-
dicted, the results thus showed that participants’ 
moral conviction in support of  gender equality 
was associated with a desire for more social dis-
tance from a sexist target, and a desire for some-
what less social distance from a feminist target.
Mediated moderation analyses. We used moderated 
mediation analysis (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) 
to investigate whether moral conviction explained 
why feminist identification led participants to 
distance themselves from the sexist target, but not 
from the feminist target. The proposed model is 
included in Figure 5. In statistical terms, we 
expected the observed interaction between femi-
nist identification and target’s stance (which indi-
cates that feminist identification is associated with 
an increased desire for social distance from the 
sexist [vs. feminist] target) would be explained by 
(a) a strong correlation between feminist identifi-
cation and moral conviction (reflecting the pro-
posed overlap between these concepts), (b) and by 
an interaction between moral conviction and tar-
get’s stance (reflecting the finding that moral con-
viction in support of  gender equality is associated 
with an increased desire for social distance from 
the sexist [vs. feminist] target).
Consequently, and following recommendations 
of  Muller et al. (2005), we consider the data to sup-
port the proposed mediated moderation model 
when each of  the following criteria are met. First of  
all, as in Study 2, individuals’ level of  feminist iden-
tification must be significantly (positively) correlated 
with the extent to which they see gender equality as 
a moral good. Second, the significant interaction 
between feminist identification and the target’s 
stance must become nonsignificant when moral 
conviction and its interaction with the target’s stance 
are included in the analyses. Third, the interaction 
between moral conviction and the target’s stance 
must remain significant when feminist identification 
and its interaction with the target’s stance are 
Figure 4. Social distancing to the target (postmeasure − premeasure) as a function of moral conviction and the 
manipulation of the target’s stance towards gender equality in Study 3.
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included in the analysis. Finally, feminist identifica-
tion must have a significant indirect effect, through 
moral conviction, on preferred social distance to the 
sexist target.
In line with these predictions, the results first 
of  all showed a strong correlation between femi-
nist identification and moral conviction, r(137) = 
.66, p < .001, which reflects the predicted overlap 
between these concepts. Furthermore, a regres-
sion analysis showed that the significant interac-
tion between feminist identification and the 
target’s stance on social distancing to the target, 
b = 0.40, t(131) = 3.96, p < .001, became nonsig-
nificant when moral conviction and its interac-
tion with the target’s stance were entered into the 
analysis, b = 0.20, t(129) = 1.51, p = .13. Thus, 
feminist identification was no longer associated 
with different reactions to the sexist and feminist 
target when we controlled for moral conviction 
and its interaction with the target’s stance.
Also as expected, the interaction between 
moral conviction and the target’s stance remained 
a significant predictor of  social distancing in this 
analysis, b = 0.31, t(129) = 2.43, p = .02. Moral 
conviction in support of  gender equality was still 
associated with a desire for greater social distance 
from the sexist target (r[65] = .32, p < .01), and 
not associated with a desire for more social close-
ness to a feminist target (r[64] = −.09, p = .50) 
when we controlled for feminist identification 
and its interaction with the target’s stance. 
Together, these results indicate that participants 
who strongly identified with feminism distanced 
themselves from the sexist target, but not from 
the feminist target, because identifying with femi-
nism implied holding a strong moral conviction 
in support of  gender equality.
A moderated mediation bootstrap analysis 
(5,000 resamples; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 
2007) corroborated these findings. The results 
showed that moral conviction mediated the effect 
of  feminist identification on social distancing 
from the sexist target, indirect effect = 0.41, bias 
corrected and accelerated 95% CI [0.22, 0.66]. 
Moral conviction did not mediate the (already 
marginal) effect of  feminist identification on the 
approach of  the feminist target, indirect effect = 
−0.17, bias corrected and accelerated 95% CI 
[−0.36, 0.01]. Thus, participants’ level of  feminist 
identification was associated with a desire to dis-
tance themselves from a sexist person to the 
extent that it implied holding a moral conviction 
about gender equality.
Simple mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 
1986) of  the effect of  feminist identification, 
through moral conviction, on social distancing 
(within the sexist target condition) corroborated 
the results of  the bootstrap analysis. First of  all, 
feminist identification was strongly predictive of  
moral conviction in the sexist target condition, 
b = 0.63, t(67) = 5.79, p < .001. Furthermore, 
feminist identification had a significant effect on 
social distancing from the sexist target, b = 0.52, 
t(66) = 3.33, p = .001, which became nonsignifi-
Identification
with
feminism
Moral conviction Socialdistancing
Target’s
stance
0.180.67***
0.44***
Figure 5. Moral conviction explains why feminist identification leads to social distancing from attitudinally 
dissimilar, but not attitudinally similar others. All regression coefficients were taken from a moderated mediation 
bootstrap analyses, using the standardized measures of feminist identification and moral conviction, and the 
effect-coded manipulation of the target’s stance.
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cant when we controlled for moral conviction, 
b = 0.25, t(65) = 1.23, p = .22. Moral conviction 
emerged as a significant predictor of  social dis-
tancing from this analysis, b = 0.52, t(65) = 2.71, 
p = .009. A Sobel test showed that the indirect 
effect of  feminist identification, through moral 
conviction, on social distancing from the sexist 
target was significant, Sobel Z = 2.47, p = .01.
Finally, additional analyses, using absolute val-
ues on the social distancing measure as the 
dependent variable, showed that both feminist 
identification (b = 0.21, SE = 0.10, t(131) = 2.21, 
p = .03) and moral conviction (B = 0.26, 
SE = 0.09, t(138) = 2.89, p = .004) were more 
strongly associated with distancing from the sex-
ist target than with approach to the feminist tar-
get. Further analyses showed that the negativity 
effect of  politicized collective identification was 
explained by moral conviction. When moral con-
viction and its interaction with target’s stance 
were controlled for, the interaction between 
politicized collective identification and target’s 
stance became nonsignificant (p = .56), whereas 
the interaction between moral conviction and tar-
get’s stance remained significant (p = .03). Thus, 
to the extent that politicized (feminist) identifica-
tion implied holding a moral conviction about 
gender inequality, it was associated with more 
negative reactions to sexism than with positive 
reactions to feminism.5
Discussion
The results of  Study 3 replicate and extend the 
results of  Studies 1 and 2. As in Studies 1 and 2, 
individuals’ level of  politicized collective identifi-
cation was shown to be an important predictor 
of  their responses to attitudinally similar and dis-
similar others. Furthermore, as in Study 2, moral 
considerations were found to be responsible for 
this effect. To the extent that politicized identifi-
cation meant holding a moral conviction about 
the collective cause, politicized individuals dis-
tanced themselves from the attitudinally dissimi-
lar target. Importantly, feminist identification did 
not predict social distancing to the sexist target 
when we controlled for moral conviction, 
whereas moral conviction did emerge as a signifi-
cant predictor of  social distancing in this analy-
sis. This finding allows us to rule out the 
possibility that feminist identification explains 
why moral conviction was associated with a 
desire for more social distance from the sexist 
target. In addition, Study 3 extends the results of  
Studies 1 and 2 by demonstrating that politicized 
identification, to the extent that it implies hold-
ing a moral conviction about the cause, is associ-
ated with a tendency to place more weight on 
attitudinal dissimilarity (but not more weight on 
attitudinal similarity) in their evaluation of  oth-
ers. Together then, the results of  Studies 1, 2, 
and 3 demonstrate the importance of  consider-
ing moral considerations for understanding the 
way politicized individuals respond to attitudi-
nally similar and dissimilar others.
General Discussion
The current studies were designed to investigate 
how politicized collective identification (i.e., iden-
tification with a social movement) affects indi-
viduals’ responses to others who either support 
or oppose the collective cause. We argued that the 
process of  politicization strengthens the forma-
tion of  a moral attitude about the collective cause. 
We expected that this moralized attitude affects 
how politicized individuals respond to attitudi-
nally similar and dissimilar others. Specifically, we 
predicted that politicized collective identification, 
to the extent that it involves holding a moral atti-
tude about the collective cause, would be associ-
ated with more negative reactions to others who 
hold a different attitude about the collective cause 
than towards like-minded others.
Three studies, using different procedures and 
measures, investigated this prediction in the con-
text of  feminism and attitudes towards gender 
inequality. The results of  these studies offer con-
vincing evidence for the role of  moral considera-
tions in politicized individuals’ attitudes towards 
attitudinally similar and dissimilar others. Study 1 
showed, as predicted based on our morality argu-
ment, that feminist participants, but not nonfemi-
nist participants, identified less with other women 
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when they believed these women to attach only a 
moderate (compared to high) moral value to gen-
der equality. Study 2 showed that politicized iden-
tification among feminist activists, to the extent 
that it implied seeing support for gender equality 
as a moral obligation, was associated with 
increased levels of  negative emotions towards 
other women who disagree with the feminist 
cause. Finally, Study 3 showed that feminist iden-
tification, to the extent that it implied holding a 
moral conviction about gender equality, was asso-
ciated with a desire for increased social distance 
from attitudinally dissimilar others. Together, the 
results of  these studies convincingly demonstrate 
the importance of  considering moral conviction 
in the way politicized individuals regard and 
respond to nonpoliticized individuals.
These findings have important implications 
for both the theory and the practice of  collective 
action. First of  all, the present results extend our 
understanding of  the relation between politicized 
and nonpoliticized individuals, and specifically 
demonstrate that politicized individuals’ view of  
others depends on these others’ level of  support 
for the collective cause. In line with predictions 
from work on politicization (e.g., Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001; Simon & Ruhs, 2008), the 
results of  Study 1 showed a strong positive rela-
tion between feminist identification and identifi-
cation with women. Importantly though, the 
current research extends the results of  this earlier 
work by showing that the relation between politi-
cized collective identification and identification 
with the relevant disadvantaged group depends 
on the extent to which this disadvantaged group 
is seen to support the collective cause. The posi-
tive relation between feminist identification and 
identification with women disappeared when 
these women were seen to offer only moderate 
moral support for the cause. The results of  
Studies 2 and 3 suggest that moral considerations 
may have been responsible for this finding. As 
these studies demonstrated, politicized individu-
als tended to respond negatively to attitudinally 
dissimilar others, to the extent that politicized 
collective identification implied holding a moral-
ized view of  the collective cause. By connecting 
politicization to moral conviction, the present 
work extends current understanding of  the rela-
tion between the politicized and both members 
of  their broader ingroup and society at large.
With an eye on the practice of  collective 
action, the current results suggest that the rela-
tion of  (highly politicized) activists with their 
broader disadvantaged ingroup, as well as with 
the general public, may not be as positive as 
would ideally be the case. According to Simon 
and colleagues (e.g., Simon & Ruhs, 2008), politi-
cization can be seen as a dual identification in that 
it implies identifying with both the broader disad-
vantaged group and with society as a whole. The 
results of  the present work suggest that the link 
between individuals’ level of  politicization and 
their level of  identification with the broader dis-
advantaged group and with society may not be 
unequivocally positive, instead depending on the 
extent to which society and the broader disadvan-
taged group are perceived to support the collec-
tive cause. Specifically, assuming that most others 
(be they unpoliticized members of  the broader 
disadvantaged ingroup or members of  the gen-
eral public) are less committed to the collective 
cause than most activists, one might expect activ-
ists, because of  their moralized view of  the cause, 
to experience a degree of  social distance between 
themselves and these others. In line with this rea-
soning, Becker and colleagues (Becker, Tausch, 
Spears, & Christ, 2011) show that individuals 
engaging in radical collective action that has little 
support among the broader ingroup can come to 
disidentify with members of  their broader 
ingroup because they see these members as insuf-
ficiently committed to the collective cause. Such 
disidentification could potentially backfire 
because the feasibility of  social change often 
depends on the support of  the broader ingroup 
and of  society as a whole (e.g., Burstein, 2006; 
Louis, 2009; Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008).
The current findings may also have implica-
tions for our understanding of  the processes 
leading individuals to radicalize in pursuit of  the 
collective goal, and to justify more hostile forms 
of  collective action. According to Simon and 
colleagues (e.g., Simon & Grabow, 2010), politi-
cized collective identification normally is not 
related to support for political violence because 
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its connection to societal identification implies 
following societal norms in pursuit of  the collec-
tive cause. They argue that only under conditions 
of  escalating conflict may politicization lead to 
the adoption of  more disruptive forms of  action 
(Simon, Reicher, & Grabow, 2013). The results 
of  the current work could help specify the con-
ditions under which this might be the case. To be 
more precise, the present results suggest that the 
radicalization of  politicized individuals should 
depend on the extent to which these individuals 
perceive society to share their stance. When they 
perceive society to disagree with their cause, 
politicized individuals could be expected to disi-
dentify with society, lowering their willingness to 
adhere to societal norms that prohibit the use of  
collective violence (e.g., Wright, Taylor, & 
Moghaddam, 1990). Importantly, research shows 
that morally convicted individuals infer the legiti-
macy of  societal institutions (e.g., the supreme 
court) from the extent to which these are seen to 
support their moral judgments, instead of  vice 
versa (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009). In a simi-
lar vein, morally convicted individuals may infer 
the legitimacy of  societal norms prohibiting col-
lective violence from the support for social 
change society is perceived to provide. When 
such support is perceived to be low, politicized 
individuals may start to doubt the legitimacy of  
societal rules that prohibit more confrontational 
forms of  collective action and start to radicalize 
(e.g., Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013). 
We are currently in the process of  investigating 
this possibility.
The current findings are broadly consistent 
with, and importantly extend, a perspective on 
politicization as identification with an opinion-
based group (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & 
Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & 
Bongiorno, 2009; Musgrove & McGarty, 2008). 
According to this work, the relevant identity for 
predicting individuals’ willingness to engage in 
collective action revolves around shared opinions 
about specific societal issues. In line with this 
prior work, the current research shows that politi-
cized individuals’ responses to others depend on 
these others’ attitudes about the collective cause. 
The current research also extends this work by 
showing that it is the moral component of  politi-
cized individuals’ opinions about the collective 
cause that explains their relations to attitudinally 
dissimilar others. Indeed, from the perspective of  
work on moral conviction (e.g., Skitka et al., 
2005), disagreement about opinions that individ-
uals do not perceive as morally relevant should 
not have led to the observed results (see also 
Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). The current 
work thus extends the opinion-based group per-
spective on politicization by demonstrating that it 
is the moral aspect of  people’s opinions that 
determines how they respond to proponents and 
opponents of  the cause.
Limitations
One possible limitation of  the present work con-
cerns the use of  a male target in Study 3. 
Specifically, it is unclear whether the negativity 
effect observed in Study 3 (i.e., the finding that 
politicized identification is primarily associated 
with negative responses to those who oppose the 
collective cause) can be generalized to female tar-
gets. We chose to use a male target in Study 3 
because we were interested in investigating 
whether the effects of  feminist identification that 
were observed in Studies 1 and 2 would extend 
beyond perceptions of  members of  the broader 
disadvantaged group. However, as a result of  this 
choice, it is not clear whether the results of  Study 
3 would have been the same if  we had used a 
female target instead. In gender political terms, 
women should form an ingroup for politicized 
feminists (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001). 
This means that, had we used a female target in 
Study 3, our politicized (vs. unpoliticized) partici-
pants may have responded more positively to the 
feminist target and less negatively to the sexist 
target. This means that the negativity effect of  
politicized identification that was observed in 
Study 3 (i.e., more negative reactions to sexism 
than positive reactions to feminism) might have 
been less pronounced (or absent) had we cho-
sen to use a female target. We acknowledge this 
possibility, and advise caution when generaliz-
ing the results of  Study 3 beyond their immedi-
ate context. More research is needed to determine 
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whether the negativity effect observed in Study 3 
generalizes to female targets.
Another possible limitation of  the current 
work is the exclusive focus on feminism and gen-
der equality as the context for our investigations. 
Because of  this, it is uncertain whether the pre-
sent results generalize to other contexts and forms 
of  politicized collective identification. However, 
the politicization process itself  has been studied in 
a variety of  contexts, and the results of  this work 
generally fit with a view of  politicized collective 
identification as involving a moral component. We 
therefore believe that the results of  the current 
work generalize to contexts other than the one 
under investigation here. Nevertheless, future 
research could investigate the generalizability of  
the present findings in contexts other than the 
one under investigation here.
Conclusion
The present work examined the role of  moral 
considerations in politicized individuals’ attitudes 
towards nonpoliticized others. The results of  
three studies showed that politicized individuals’ 
responses to others depend on the extent to 
which these others are seen to support the cause. 
In addition, Studies 2 and 3 revealed that moral 
considerations explained this effect; individuals’ 
level of  politicization was primarily associated 
with negative responses to attitudinally dissimilar 
others because politicization implied holding a 
moral conviction about the collective cause.
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Notes
1. Post hoc power analysis showed that, in the main 
analysis of  the results of  Study 1 a sample size of  
N = 85 (at α = .05) yielded considerable power 
(.80) for detecting effect sizes (R2) of  .086 or 
above. The observed power of  the interaction 
effect between politicized (feminist) identification 
and the manipulation of  the moral importance 
other women attached to gender equality was .78.
2. According to Fritz and McKinnon (2007), when 
testing for simple mediation effects, the sample 
size needed to achieve a power of  .80 depends on 
the method used for testing mediation effects and 
on the strength of  the IV to mediator and media-
tor to DV paths. When the IV to M and M to 
DV paths are moderately strong (as is the case in 
the present study), a sample size of  approximately 
N = 70 is needed for a bias corrected bootstrap-
ping analysis to reach a power of  .80 (at α = .05). 
The mediation analysis reported in the Results sec-
tion of  Study 2 is thus somewhat underpowered.
3. The reduced number of  degrees of  freedom in 
these analyses is caused by the list-wise deletion 
of  two cases with missing values on the Feminist 
Identification Scale.
4. Due to the list-wise deletion of  missing values, 
the effective sample size of  the analyses of  Study 
3 is somewhat lower (between N = 141 and N = 
134, depending on which variables are included in 
the analysis). In the analyses reported here, these 
sample sizes yielded considerable power (.80 at 
α = .05) for detecting effects with effect sizes (R2) 
of  approximately 4%.
5. Some of  the items we used to measure moral 
conviction in Study 3 did not explicitly refer to 
the moral value participants attached to gender 
equality. An additional (bias corrected) bootstrap 
analysis, using only the subset of  moral convic-
tion items that refer directly to the moralization 
of  individuals’ attitudes towards gender equality 
corroborated our finding that moral conviction 
explains the effects of  feminist identification on 
social distancing from the sexist target (indirect 
effect = 0.27, 95% CI = [0.13, 0.45]), but not 
from the feminist target, (indirect effect = −0.10, 
95% CI = [−0.23, 0.02], index of  mediated mod-
eration = 0.37, 95% CI = [0.18, 0.58]).
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Appendix A
High Moral Importance Condition
The survey clearly demonstrated the consensus among Dutch women about the moral importance of  
gender equality. More than 65% of  the women who were asked indicated that for them gender equality 
is either a strong moral issue (Answer Category 6) or a very strong moral issue (Answer Category 7; 
see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The moral loading of Dutch women’s attitudes about gender equality among Dutch women.
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Figure 1. The moral loading of Dutch women’s attitudes about gender equality among Dutch women.
Moderate Moral Importance Condition
The survey clearly demonstrated that Dutch women tend to place only moderate moral value on gen-
der equality. More than 65% of  the women who were asked indicated that for them gender equality 
forms either a somewhat moral issue (Answer Category 3) or moderately moral issue (Answer Category 
4; see Figure 1).
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Appendix B
Measures Used in Study 3
Moral conviction. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following state-
ments (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree)
1) My position on gender equality is a reflection of  my core moral beliefs and convictions.
2) Gender equality is something I care a lot about.
3) I see my position on gender equality as nonnegotiable.
4) Gender equality is personally important to me.
5) I see my view on gender equality as a moral absolute.
6) My stance on gender equality reflects a moral value that I believe should apply everywhere in 
the world.
7) My stance on gender equality reflects a moral value that I believe should apply at all times.
Feminist Identification
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of  the following statements (1 = com-
pletely disagree, 7 = completely agree)
1) I feel a bond with feminists.
2) I feel solidarity with feminists.
3) I think feminists have a lot to be proud of.
4) It is pleasant to be a feminist.
5) Feminism forms an important part of  my identity.
6) Being a feminist is an important part of  how I see myself.
7) I have a lot in common with the average feminist.
8) I am similar to the average feminist.
9) Feminists have a lot in common with each other.
10) Feminists are very similar to each other.
Social Distance
(1 = very unhappy, 7 = very happy)
1) To which extent would you be happy or unhappy to have John as your neighbour?
2) To which extent would you be happy or unhappy to have John as a colleague?
3) To which extent would you be happy or unhappy to have John marry into your family?
4) To which extent would you be happy or unhappy to have John as your personal physician?
5) To which extent would you be happy or unhappy to have John as your close personal friend?
6) To which extent would you be happy or unhappy to have John as the teacher of  your children?
Appendix C
The Manipulation of the Target’s Stance Towards Gender Equality
Sexist target condition. John considers himself to be traditional in his views on gender equality. Accord-
ing to John, men are better suited for most types of work than women. If he were to marry, John 
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indicates, he would not allow his wife to have a full-time job. “It’s a woman’s job to take care of the 
kids, to keep the house clean, and to prepare the meals” John claims. “I oppose feminism because it 
upsets the natural relation between men and women.”
Feminist target condition. John considers himself  to be progressive in his views on gender equality. 
According to John, men and women are equally equipped for most, if  not all, types of  work. If  he 
were to marry, John indicates, he would be happy for his wife if  she would have a full-time job. “Equal-
ity between men and women is important to me” John indicates, “Taking care of  children, keeping the 
house clean, and preparing the meals are responsibilities men and women should share.” “Thus, I fully 
support feminism.”
